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This article lists the content and deals with the criteria for 
assessing the presence or absence of material damage suffered by 
the applicant to the European Court of Human Rights, the subject 
of entrepreneurship, as a new condition for the admissibility of 
an individual application. The article establishes that the list and 
content of the criteria for assessing the presence or absence of 
material damage suffered by the applicant to the European Court of 
Human Rights are different for individuals and for legal entities – 
business entities. Moreover, the article initiates a discussion on the 
list and content of these criteria for the subjects of entrepreneurship 
– the applicants to the European Court of Human Rights. In the light 
of the Court's practice, the author reveals their content as well as legal 
categories such as ‘substantial harm’, ‘financial harm’, ‘pecuniary 
damage’, ‘non-pecuniary damage’ incurred by the applicant, the 
subject of entrepreneurship, and highlights the issues to which 
objectives may be caused by ‘moral harm’ in case of violation of the 
rights of the subject of entrepreneurship.
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Introduction
The right to an individual appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights is the cornerstone of the Convention system. 
Having used all national remedies, entrepreneurs who consider 
themselves victims of an alleged violation of their rights by 
one of the State Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Convention’), appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’). They lodge 
applications to the Court to restore their violated rights at the 
national level in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Since 1998, the number of legal entities appealing to the Court 
has been increasing. This can be attributed to many factors, 
such as the ratification of the Convention by the new countries 
Moldova (1997), Ukraine (1997), Russian Federation (1998) and 
its entry into force in the said countries1. The second factor 
is the non-fulfilment or inappropriate execution of national 
courts decisions with the state or state-owned enterprises 
primarily being the debtor. The third factor can be found in the 
systemic shortcomings of the national legislation in number 
of countries and application practices already reflected in pilot 
decisions against them. Last but not least, military conflicts in 
the states Members of the Council of Europe as a result of which 
the subjects of business, being the victims of violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties by the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto, apply to the Court. 
Mainly in the light of a continuous increase in the caseload 
of the Court and the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, and, in particular, the need to enable the Court to 
preserve its leading role in the protection of human rights in 
Europe in order to maintain and improve the effectiveness 
of the control system in the future, the international legal 
mechanism of access to the Court has changed. The conditions 
of admissibility of individual applications comprise one of the 
elements of this mechanism (Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, 
Protocol No. 15 to the Convention). In accordance with the 
changes introduced into the Convention by the Protocol No. 
1 See for details the European Court of Human Rights, Violations by Article and by 
State, 1959-2017; European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of statistics by year 2006-
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15 of 24 June 2013 (open for signing by the High Contracting 
Parties to the Convention), ‘the Court declares inadmissible any 
individual application submitted in accordance with Article 
34 if the Court considers that the applicant has not suffered 
material damage’ (The Council of Europe 2013). the Convention 
and the Protocols thereto do not require any consideration of 
the application concerning merits.
‘Substantial damage’ is a complex abstract concept. In any 
given case the Court formulates a legal position(s) on the 
interpretation of this Convention. The mere list and content 
of the general criteria for assessing (measuring) the presence 
or absence of substantial damage led to a sharp debate among 
judges of the Court, lawyers, governments of the State Parties to 
the Convention, experts (for some of the best-known works see 
Keller, Fischer and Kühne 2010: 1037-1039; Leach 2011: 41; Jacobs, 
White and Ovey 2017: 17-18, 44). They are the continuation of 
previous discussions on the principle of ‘dе minimis non еurеt 
еrееtor’, the application of which used to be ‘disguised’ in nature 
(previously not formally fixed in the Convention, but rather 
referred to it in the judgments of the Court), as well discussions 
on the applicants’ right to access the Court.
The Legal Department has generalised the Court’s case on the list 
and content of criteria for measuring the presence or absence 
of material damage to the applicant as an individual (ECHR 
2014). The Secretariat of the Court prepared ‘A Practical Guide on 
Admissibility Criteria (ECHR 2014). A High-Level Conference of 
the member States of the Council of Europe in the Declaration 
on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights actively 
encouraged States-members to consider facilitating their 
translation into the respective national languages. At the same 
time, the issue of the list of criteria for material damage and 
their content regarding applicants as entrepreneurs remained 
unnoticed in these publications.
The introduction of a new condition for the admissibility of 
individual applications - substantial harm – has become an 
impetus for the intensification of discussions among scholars 
about the role of the new condition for the admissibility of an 
individual statement by the Court in the international legal 
mechanism for access to the Court (Gerards, Glas et al. 2017), as 
well as with respect only to the general criteria for assessing 
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of the application – be it an individual or a legal entity as a 
subject of entrepreneurship (for some of the best known works 
see Shelton 2016; Rainey, Wicks and Ovey et al. 2017).
Paragraph 80 of the Explanatory Commentary to Protocol No. 
14 affirms that ‘the Contracting Parties expect the Court to 
develop an objective criterion for the application of the new 
rule through the gradual development of precedent practice’. 
On 1 February 2017 the Court applied this criterion to more 
than 30 cases and rejected applications in more than 20 cases. 
Most of them were cases against Ukraine2. From one case to 
another the Court formulates the legal position (provision) 
for the interpretation of material harm. The Court’s case-law 
shows that the list and content of the criteria for assessing 
the presence or absence of material damage suffered by the 
applicant may not be the same for individuals and legal entities 
as entrepreneurs. For the first time in legal science, this article 
launches a discussion on the list and content of these criteria 
for business entities as applicants to the Court.
Introduction of a new condition for the admissibility of an 
individual statement by the Court – significant damage
On 1 June 2010 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention entered 
into force. It introduced a new condition for the admissibility 
of an individual application by the Court causing the applicant 
a significant harm. Previously, ‘de minimis’ was not formally 
enshrined in the Convention. There it was only referenced 
in the judgments of the Court (Deshko 2016: 220). Thus, its 
application had a hidden (disguised) nature.
26-27 April 2011 a high-level conference of the member States 
of the Council of Europe approved the Declaration on the 
future of the Court. The Conference challenged the Court 
to give full effect onto the new admissibility condition in 
accordance with the principle that the Court does not deal 
with trifles (‘de minimis non curat praetor’).
‘Substantial damage’ is a complex abstract concept; that 
has been causing sharp debate during its consideration. 
According to the position of the constitutionalists, shared not 
2 See for details the European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of statistics 2006-2017; 
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only by the bulk of the judges of the Court but the majority of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe member 
States as well, the Court gained special powers to reject 
cases that do not overlook important issues enclosed by the 
Convention.
Opposing the constitutionalists are supporters of the so-
called individual justice or ‘individualists. They consider 
‘substantial harm’ and the principle of ‘de minimis non 
curat prеetor’ as a barrier to filing complaints to the Court by 
individuals or legal entities, and underline that the legality of 
the Court for individuals is at the heart of judicial protection. 
‘Substantial damage’ as a condition for the admissibility of 
an individual statement also causes a sharp debate among 
academics and politicians. Nikos Vogiatzis argues that ‘the 
admissibility criterion: undermines direct access to justice at 
the international level; affects the right of individual petition 
to the Strasbourg Court; constitutes misunderstanding of the 
subsidiarity principle within the Convention machinery’ 
(Vogiatzis 2016: 185). N.  Sevostyanova, Ukrainian Deputy 
Minister of Justice in her dissertation entitled ‘Appeal to 
the European Court of Human Rights as the realisation of 
the right to access to justice warns that... in the presence of 
unconditional positive decisions, it is necessary to recognise 
that there is a probability of lowering the level of access to 
the ECHR... so that the concept of ‘substantial harm’ is a very 
abstract category. Due to the lack of normative specification, 
this could be the reason for the rejection of many individual 
statements, which are violations of the Convention and need 
to be considered by the Court’ (Sevostyanova 2011: 17). Gerards’, 
Glas’ scientific researches explore two approaches to the notion 
of access to justice, both generally and for the Convention 
system specifically. The main argument of the researches is 
to show the value of taking a substantive approach to access to 
justice in the Convention system (Gerards, Glas 2017: 11). 
Regarding these discussions, let us quote our arguments. 
In the Declaration on the Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights (The Council of Europe 2011), the Conference 
‘reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to the right to 
individual treatment is the cornerstone of the Convention 
system’. According to Article 53 of the Convention, ‘nothing 
in it may be interpreted as limiting or derogating from 
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recognised under the laws of any High Contracting Party or 
by any other agreement being a part of it’. According to the 
statistics of the Court in 2016, 53.500 new applications were 
filed with the Court. Compared to 2015 (40.550 applications), 
the overall increase is 32%. 27.300 of them were identified 
as the subject to a single judge formation and likely to be 
declared inadmissible (a decrease of 1% relative to 2015). 26.200 
applications were identified as likely to be considered by 
chambers or committees (an increase of 100%)3. Consequently, 
regarding a large number of individual claim that essentially 
raise the issue of violation of the rules of the Convention and 
need to be considered by the Court, the decline in the level 
of access to the Court by their deviation of the criterion for 
absence of ‘significant damage’.
Furthermore, Article 35 (3) (b) of the Convention contains the 
following clause: the respect for human rights guaranteed 
by the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of the merits, even if the applicant has not 
suffered material damage. This is precisely a compromise 
between the positions of the constitutionalists and the 
idealists. As it can be seen, the condition of the admissibility 
of an individual statement ‘significant harm’ is not absolute. 
Even if the applicant has not suffered material damage, 
respect for human rights requires a substantive consideration, 
so that the Court cannot declare individual application as 
inadmissible.
The foregoing suggests that the introduction of a condition 
for the admissibility of cases in accordance with the principle 
that the Court does not deal with trifles (de minimis non 
curat praetor) neither restricts the applicants’ right of 
access to the Court, nor the right to individual treatment. 
These rights are the cornerstone of the Convention system, 
although the Convention has a subsidiary nature. The purpose 
of introducing a new eligibility criterion for individual 
applications was solely to ensure the effectiveness of the 
conventional mechanism in the short, medium and long term.
3 http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c=#n1347956700110_pointer 
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The general approach of the European Court of Human Rights 
to the understanding of material harm and the list of criteria 
for measuring its presence or absence
Although the Convention does not define the term 
‘substantial harm’, according to Article 32 of the Convention, 
the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all questions of 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto. In the Declaration on the Future of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Conference challenged 
the Court to clarify this new condition for the admissibility of 
individual applications by the subsequent practice of the Court 
and consistently apply the principles of interpretation of the 
Convention.
Completely following the same lines as the judges of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, in the presence of Yevgrafov 
and Tykhiy, it can be said that in its decisions the Court 
formulates general and settled positions regarding the 
understanding of the conventions that ‘have a common action, 
that is they apply to an indefinite circle of persons as to an 
unlimited number of similar situations (‘inexhaustibility’ of 
the explanation). Therefore, in the future, the Court is guided by 
them and relying on them when considering other analogous 
cases’ (Yevgrafov and Tykhiy 2012). Precisely those decisions in 
which the Court developed general and settled positions on the 
perception of material harm have been chosen for the study. 
By such decisions it is possible to acquire new knowledge of 
the term “significant harm”, as well as the list and content of 
the criteria for assessing the presence or absence of material 
damage to the business entities as applicants.
The application of the principle of ‘dе minimis non еurеt еrееtor’ 
by the Court of dates to 1972 in the case of X. against the UK 
(ECHR 1972). In 1981 the European Commission on Human Rights, 
having analysed the circumstances of this case, concluded that 
the size of the damage inflicted on the applicant in connection 
with the failure to provide him with the opportunity to consult 
a lawyer is negligible (ECHR 1981). Referring to the principle of ‘dе 
minimis non еurеt еrееtor’, the Human Rights Commission decided 
on inadmissibility. Another example is the judgment of the 
Court in the case Comochis and others vs. Greece (ECHR 2001). As 
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non еurеt еrееtor» the Greek Government declared the applicant’s 
material damage insignificant (slightly over 50 Euro). The 
Court noted that the applicant had complained not only of the 
pecuniary damage of it, but also of lengthy proceedings before 
the national courts, and found the issue substantial under the 
Convention thus not depriving the applicant of the status of 
victim of a violation of the Convention.
Shelton righteously admits that the ‘Court finds that only 
general and rather subjective measure applied’ (Shelton 2016: 
303). However, as it can be seen, the practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights testifies that the main element of the 
admissibility criterion is the question whether the applicant 
was inflicted on a violation of his/her right or fundamental 
freedom of ‘significant disadvantage’. The criterion of 
‘significant disadvantage’ is based on the idea that the violation 
of law, irrespective of the extent to which such a violation of a 
legal position is materialised should reach a minimum degree 
of gravity for being considered by the International Court. This 
is the Court’s general approach to understanding of material 
harm. The assessment of this minimum level is naturally 
relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case.
The Department of Legal Counsel of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the fourth edition of The Practical guide 
on admissibility of criteria emphasises that in many cases 
the severity of the damage is determined by the financial 
dimensions of the issue under consideration and the 
importance of the case for the applicant. The financial measure 
is assessed from the point of view of material and moral damage. 
In the judgment in Kiusy vs. Greece, the Court found the sum of 
EUR 1 000 claimed by the applicant for non-pecuniary damage 
as not decisive for assessing the true significance of the case 
for the applicant (The Council of Europe 2014: 97). According to 
the Court in the case of Fernandes vs. France, the consequences 
of material damage should not be abstractly measured, since 
even a small financial loss may be substantial given the specific 
circumstances of the person and the economic situation in the 
country or region in which it resides (ECHR 2010).
Thus, the financial damage suffered by the applicant is one of 
the criteria for measuring the presence or absence of material 
damage. The assessment of the financial damage suffered by 
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in relation to whether it amounts to or exceeds a certain 
amount. There is no decision of the Court determining the size 
of the financial damage caused to the applicant that would 
be recognised by the Court as material one. Accordingly, the 
assessment of financial damage suffered by the applicant is 
carried out as a pecuniary damage assessment in terms of the 
specific financial situation of the person and the economic 
situation in the country or region in which the applicant 
lives, and as a non-pecuniary damage, having regard to the 
significance of the impact which it had on the applicant.
Kovler, the judge of the Court at the detention centre, focuses on 
the ruling of the Court in the case of Korolev vs. Russia, in which 
the Court pointed out that ‘the significance of the damage 
should be assessed in the light of objective social interest’ (Kovler 
2011: 13). Concerning the question of the assessment of the 
public interest in determining the significance of the damage 
to the Court’s practice, the principle that complaints violations 
of fundamental absolute rights will always raise objectively 
important issues and cannot be declared inadmissible.
In the case of Budchenko vs. Ukraine the Court pointed out 
yet another criterion for the existence or absence of material 
damage. ‘The severity of the alleged violation must be assessed 
in the light of both, the subjective perception of the applicant 
and the fact that the subject of the dispute is objectively 
relevant to the applicant in a particular case’ (ECHR 2014). 
In the case of Vatrik vs. Romania the Court noted that the 
subject of the complaint was a matter of principle and found 
the case admissible. In the case of Giuran vs. Romania the 
most important point, according to the Court, was that ‘for 
the applicant the fundamental question was precisely the 
protection of his right to respect for his property and housing’ 
(ECHR 2011). In view of these considerations, such a complaint 
was found to be admissible.
One of the criteria for assessing material damage the Court also 
refers to is the gravity of the alleged violation for the exercise of 
the right and/or the possible consequences of such a violation 
for the applicant’s personal situation (Luchaninova vs. Ukraine, 
ECHR 2011; Gagliano Giorgi vs. Italy, ECHR 2012).
Thus, as established by the analysis, the criteria for assessing 
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has suffered are as follows: financial damage to the applicant; 
public interest and the nature of the right; violation of the 
applicant’s subjective attitude to the question of violation of 
his/her rights and/or fundamental freedom and issues which 
are objectively relevant to him/her in one or another case; 
the seriousness of the alleged violation for the exercise of the 
rights and/or possible consequence of such a violation for the 
applicant.
The list and content of the criteria for assessing the presence 
or absence of material damage suffered by the applicant as the 
subject of entrepreneurship
Financial damage to the applicant
The practice of the Court shows that the assessment of the 
financial damage suffered by the applicant should not be 
carried out abstractly, rather assessed in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case. In the case of East/West Alliance 
Limited vs. Ukraine, the applicant is an Irish company East/
West Alliance Ltd located in Dublin, with a representative office 
in Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the “applicant company”), 
alleging a violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol, as well 
as Article 6, paragraph 1, and Article 13 of the Convention in 
connection with the numerous and diverse interferences of 
the authorities with its ownership over fourteen aircrafts 
allegedly resulting in the deprivation of the applicant 
company’s property and in assessing the damage caused to 
it as significant, evaluating it at USD 165915960 for material 
damage caused and USD 10,000 for moral damage caused (ECHR 
2017). The analysis of the case shows that the applicant included 
the following: 1) compensation equivalent to the present 
market value of fourteen aircrafts, similar to those it had been 
deprived of; 2) lost profit; 3) the above-mentioned profit from 
the Lease agreement to a bank account with an average annual 
interest of 3.8%; 4) expenses incurred under the Agreement of 
4 June 2003 on the protection of six An-28 planes. The Court 
drew attention to the fact that ‘the exact calculation of the 
amount of damage suffered by the applicant may sometimes be 
impossible in connection with the nature of damage resulting 
from the violation, which is uncertain in its nature. There may 
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accurately the value of a property that no longer exists’ (East/
West Alliance Limited v. Ukraine, ECHR 2014, §250). The Court 
was also ‘aware of difficulties in calculating lost profits in 
circumstances where such profits may fluctuate due to a variety 
of unpredictable factors’ (§47). This is especially true in cases 
of ‘economic activity of the enterprise, in which the risks are 
assumed to a great degree of uncertainty concerning profitable 
use of the property’ (§26).
As to the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant, 
which according to the general approach of the Court is also 
one of the criteria for measuring the presence or absence of 
material damage; in the opinion of the author of this issue 
regarding business entities is debatable. Could it be the legal 
entity – the subject of entrepreneurship caused non-pecuniary 
damage?
In the judgment in Agrokompleks (Ukraine Agricultural 
Production Complex) vs. Ukraine (ECHR 2018), the Court observes 
that ‘causing a non-pecuniary damage to a commercial 
enterprise it is impossible to provide precise calculation 
for moral damage of a commercial enterprise’ (§79) that it is 
‘impossible in principle to make a precise calculation of moral 
damage to a commercial enterprise’ (§79). The Court therefore 
evaluates on an equitable basis. ‘If one or more types of damage 
cannot be accurately quantified or the difference between 
material and moral damage is difficult to determine, the Court 
may decide to make an overall assessment’ (Comingersoll S.A. 
vs Portugal, ECHR 2000, §29).
In other judgments the Court notes that ‘pecuniary damage 
received by commercial enterprises may include aspects 
that are, to a greater or lesser extent, ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’. 
The aspects that can be considered include the company’s 
reputation, uncertainty in decision-making, business 
management issues (for which there is no precise method of 
calculating the consequences) and finally albeit to lesser extent, 
anxiety and inconvenience as for management’ (Comingersoll 
S.A. vs. Portugal, ECHR 2000, §29).
As it can be seen, the Court applies a broad approach to the 
interpretation of non-pecuniary damage inflicted on a business 
entity. In doing so, the Court does not include the moral 
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of emotion are incompatible with the legal nature of any given 
legal entity. A legal entity is an artificially created subject of law 
that does not have a psyche. But a legal person may be subject 
to non-pecuniary damage, which results in a deterioration 
of business reputation. Negative influence on the positive 
assessment of business qualities of a legal entity may lead to 
harmful consequences of a non-property nature, such as a 
deterioration or deprivation of the possibility for the entity to 
pursue its objectives and tasks, the deterioration of its relations 
with partners etc.; the experience of certain mental sufferings 
by individuals who are part of the management of the subject 
of entrepreneurship etc.
Thus, to the moral harm of a business entity the Court includes 
non-pecuniary damage caused to the legal entity itself, and 
moral damage caused to the management (administration) of 
a legal entity – individuals.
In assessing the Court’s use of the said criterion of the presence 
or absence of significant harm, theorists are not unanimous 
(Gerards, Glas 2017: 11; Vogiatzis 2016: 185). To our mind, harm 
suffered by an individual applicant to the Court, the harm Court 
assesses this damage when considering the admissibility of this 
application is not decisive for the Court itself. It is important 
for the Court to assess the presence or absence of significant 
harm, in combination with another criterion – the importance 
of the case for the applicant. This will be considered further in 
this study. Now, we would like to emphasise that no decision of 
the Court establishes the fixed size of non-pecuniary damage 
caused to the applicant, a business entity, which would be 
recognised by the Court as essential. The Court since the right 
to individual treatment is the cornerstone of the Convention, 
assesses the applicant’s situation and the economic situation 
in a country or region where he has violated his rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the State Party to the Convention.
Public interest and the nature of the violated law
The second criterion for assessing material damage, being 
the object of the present analysis, is the public interest and the 
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Thus, in the case of CJSC Pivdenbudtrans and others vs. Ukraine 
(CJSC “Pivdenbudtrans” and others vs. Ukraine, ECHR 2017), the 
applicants complained about the duration of civil proceedings 
and the lack of effective remedy in domestic legislation. The 
Court noted it had established ‘in the case groups Svetlana 
Naumenko vs. Ukraine (ECHR 2004) and Efimenko vs. Ukraine 
(ECHR 2006) violations on issues like those considered in this 
case and declared these complaints to be admissible’.
In the decision of the case of LTD “Polimerkonteiner” vs. 
Ukraine (ECHR 2016) the applicant complained, inter alia, to the 
continuing practice of the customs authorities to determine 
the wrong code of the goods imported by the applicant 
company, which entails a higher duty and contradicts the 
position of numerous final court decisions in favour of the 
applicant company. On 15 March 2016 the Court proposed that 
the Government should comment on the admissibility and 
substance of the complaint lodged by the applicant company 
in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning the 
continued failure of the customs authority to take judicial 
decisions in favour of the applicant company regarding the 
determination of the wrong code for its imported goods. The 
Court disagreed with the Government’s reference to the fact that 
‘this complaint is clearly groundless in the meaning of part 3 of 
Article 35 of the Convention. It also noted that this complaint is 
not inadmissible on any other grounds’ (ECHR 2016).
Regarding the nature of the breach of law, which is one of the 
criteria for assessing material damage, the Court noted that the 
first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 is the lawfulness of any interference by public authorities 
in the peaceful possession of property. The requirement of 
legality, within the meaning of the Convention, requires 
compliance with the relevant provisions of domestic law and 
compliance with the rule of law, which includes freedom from 
arbitrariness. Moreover, the Court emphasised that in any case 
of interference, including those aimed at paying taxes, a ‘fair 
balance’ between the requirements of the general interests of 
the public and the requirements of protecting the fundamental 
rights of the individual should be observed. In the whole, the 
desire to achieve such a balance is reflected in the structure 
of Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1. The required balance cannot 
be met if the person concerned must bear an individual and 
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The Court noted that ‘it considered a similar situation in the 
case of Intersplav vs. Ukraine, in which the applicant company 
had to initiate litigation concerning numerous instances of 
refusal by the authorities to confirm the amount of VAT refunds 
to be paid to the applicant company’ (ECHR 2007, §38-40) The 
Court concluded that the result of systematic violations by the 
public authorities was the overwhelming burden placed on the 
applicant company. The same idea applies to the case of LTD 
“Polimerkonteiner” vs. Ukraine.
Governments often state that the Court, when assessing the 
appropriateness of an individual application for a de minimis 
criterion should consider measures taken by a State to reduce or 
eliminate the consequences of violating the applicant’s rights 
and/or fundamental freedoms. Regarding this, the Court notes 
that the recognition by the respondent State of the violation 
and the provision of compensation to the applicant on the 
national level cannot automatically justify the recognition of 
an individual application as inadmissible. Damage caused by a 
violation of the provisions of the Convention cannot be reduced 
to a purely economic measure. In paragraphs 32-35 of the Sancho 
Cruz case and 14 other “Agrarian Reform cases vs. Portugal”, the 
position of the Court is reduced to the fact that even in cases 
where the compensation offered at the national level is higher 
than that normally granted by the Court in similar cases, such 
a compensation cannot be a determining factor in the question 
of inadmissibility, as this issue requires an assessment of the 
nature of the violation and the severity of the damage caused, 
and not only of its consequences (ECHR 2011).
Subjective attitude of the applicant
Another criterion for assessing material damage is the 
subjective attitude of the applicant towards the issue of 
violation of his/her right and/or fundamental freedom and 
issues that are objectively relevant to him/her in one or another 
case.
Thus, in the case of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel 
vs. Ukraine (ECHR 2011) the subject of the complaint was a matter 
of principle for the first applicant - the violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention and the indication of the general measures to 
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in line with the ‘European standards of freedom of expression’ 
with regard to the use of ‘socially relevant information from 
the Internet, the authenticity of which is doubtful’. As to the 
second applicant, the Court noted that he/she had been caused 
some distress and anxiety because of violation of his/her rights.
The gravity of the consequences of the alleged violation
The fourth criterion for assessing material damage is the 
seriousness of the consequences of the alleged violation for the 
exercise of the right and/or the possible consequences of such a 
violation for the applicant.
In the case of the newspaper Ukraine-centre vs. Ukraine (ECHR 
2010), the applicant company assessed the inflicted financial 
loss at EUR 9675.57. This amount included the amount paid to 
the plaintiff in the case of discredit considering the expenses 
incurred by him/her for the payment of executive fees and 
inflationary costs. It also claimed € 20,000 in respect of non-
pecuniary damage, arguing that the amount awarded by the 
national court had caused financial difficulties leading to the 
release of journalists, increased publishing costs and a reduced 
circulation. The court declared the case admissible.
Conclusions
The Court granted full effect to the new admissibility of 
cases in accordance with the principle that the Court does 
not deal with trifles (‘dе minimis non еurеt еrееtor’). Although 
‘substantial harm’ is a complex abstract concept, the Court, 
however, has developed objective criteria for its application 
through the gradual development of precedent practice.
At present day the Court ’s general approach to the 
understanding of material harm is based on the idea that 
the violation of law, regardless of the extent to which such a 
violation of a legal position has been materialised, should 
reach a minimum degree of gravity for it to be considered by 
the international court.
The article initiated a discussion on the list and content 
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material damage suffered by the applicant as the subject of 
entrepreneurship. Thus, the list of these criteria includes the 
following: financial damage to the applicant; the public interest 
and the nature of the law, the violation of which is claimed by 
the applicant; the subjective attitude of the applicant towards 
the violation of applicant’s right and issues that are objectively 
relevant to him/her in a particular case; the gravity of the 
consequences of the alleged violation for the exercise of the 
right and/or the possible consequences of such violation for 
the applicant’s personal situation.
Pecuniary damage suffered by a legal entity includes: the 
value of lost, damaged or destroyed property; additional costs 
(penalties paid to other entities, the cost of additional works, 
additional expenditures, etc.); the unearned profit (loss of 
profit) for which the applicant was entitled to count.
The Court applies a broad approach to the interpretation of 
non-pecuniary damage suffered by a business entity, in fact 
including non-pecuniary damage caused to the legal entity 
itself and moral damage to the management of a legal entity, 
individuals. Altogether, the non-material damage caused 
to the legal entity itself and the moral damage caused to the 
management of a legal entity – individuals, the Court calls 
moral damage caused to the individual beingthe subject of 
entrepreneurship. It is precisely the use of the term ‘moral 
harm caused to the subject of entrepreneurship’ that seems 
not to be correct because the moral suffering of a legal entity 
as one of the manifestations of emotions is incompatible with 
the legal nature of the legal entity. A legal person may be caused 
non-pecuniary damage, which results in the deterioration of 
business reputation. Moral damage may be caused only to 
individuals being the management of the business entity. 
In addition, although answering the question: ‘Does the entity 
cause significant harm?’, - the court assesses in aggregation of 
material and non-property damage caused to the entrepreneur 
as well as moral damage inf licted on his management 
(administration), nevertheless not seen as correct unification 
of non-property damage to the subject of entrepreneurship and 
moral damage inflicted on to management by the only category 
- moral damage to the entrepreneur.
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the light of current conditions the Convention containing list 
of criteria for assessing (measuring) the presence or absence of 
material damage cannot be established once and for all. The 
said criterion will vary depending on the realities of life, thus 
creating a space for further research.
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